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U.S. farmers have until June 1 to decide if they want to enroll in ACRE (Average Crop 
Revenue Election) for the 2009 crop 
year. ACRE participants must give 
up eligibility for countercyclical 
payments and 20 percent of their 
direct payments. Participants are 
still eligible for marketing loans, 
but loan rates are reduced by 30 
percent. Perhaps the most impor-
tant factor that will infl uence ACRE 
participation is whether farmers 
believe that they will receive more 
payments from ACRE than they will 
give up. This is a diffi cult question 
to answer because the loss in direct 
payments is the only future payment 
that is known with certainty. Loan 
defi ciency payments (LDPs) depend 
on the level of market prices and 
yields. Countercyclical payments 
(CCPs) depend on the level of Na-
tional Agricultural Statistics Service 
(NASS) season-average prices rela-
tive to target prices. ACRE payments 
depend on both NASS prices and 
state yields. None of these factors 
can be known at the time of sign-up. 
However, a careful examination of 
how prices and yields affect ACRE 
payments relative to traditional pro-
gram payments reveals that unless 
prices move signifi cantly higher in 
the next few months, nearly all corn, 
soybean, and wheat farmers will fi nd 
that signing up for ACRE will im-
prove their fi nancial position. 
Guarantees in 2009
Table 1 provides the data needed to 
compare payments under traditional 
programs and under ACRE for corn, 
soybeans, and wheat. [For details 
about how ACRE works, see http://
www.card.iastate.edu/ag_risk_tools/
acre/faq.aspx.] The three rows un-
der each program compare direct 
payment rates, CCP prices or ACRE 
prices, and loan rates. Direct pay-
ments and loan rates are reduced 
under ACRE. But the price used to 
set the ACRE revenue guarantee 
is much higher than the CCP trig-
ger price. State revenue guarantees 
are presented next in Table 1. The 
guarantees are calculated by tak-
ing 90 percent of the product of the 
estimated ACRE price and the aver-
age state yield per planted acre from 
2004 to 2008, after eliminating the 
highest and lowest yields during this 
period. State revenue triggers vary 
across states because the state aver-
age yield varies. Separate irrigated 
and dryland guarantees are calcu-
lated if a state has suffi cient planted 
acreage in each. 
The best indicator of the attrac-
tiveness of signing up for ACRE is 
the level of 2009 crop prices rela-
tive to the ACRE price. If 2009 crop 
prices are expected to be lower 
than the ACRE price, then expected 
payments at the time of sign-up will 
be large. But expected large pay-
ments do not necessarily lead to 
actually getting large payments. Ac-
tual ACRE payments may turn out 
to be zero if state yields are good 
Table 1. Farm program guarantees in 2009
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or if crop prices rise unexpectedly.  
This uncertainty about future pric-
es and yields illustrates why it will 
be diffi cult for farmers to choose a 
program. 
Should Farmers Choose ACRE?
The decision about whether to 
choose ACRE gets clearer once some 
standard tools of decision analysis 
are brought to bear on the problem. 
First, what should concern farmers 
is the difference in payments across 
the two programs. If, for all possible 
futures, ACRE pays out more than 
traditional farm programs, then the 
choice is simple: choose ACRE. But 
we know the decision is not that sim-
ple because if ACRE is not triggered 
in a state, then the 20 percent loss in 
direct payments under ACRE means 
that traditional farm programs would 
generate greater payments than 
ACRE. So those farmers who believe 
that future prices will be higher than 
the Table 1 ACRE prices and that 
state yields will be stable should not 
choose ACRE.
But most farmers know that 
there is a good chance that future 
prices could be low, and all farmers 
know that state yields can fall dra-
matically. Thus, we need to assess 
the probability that prices or state 
yields will drop to levels that trig-
ger ACRE payments. While nobody 
knows what future yields are going 
to be, past fl uctuations in grow-
ing conditions and yields can give 
insight into the probability that 2009 
state average yields will fall below 
a certain level. A standard measure 
of variability is the percentage by 
which the actual yield differs from 
the trend yield in any year. Figure 1 
shows the yearly deviations for corn 
yields in Iowa and South Dakota from 
1980 to 2007. It is clear that yields 
can fall signifi cantly below trend 
yields in both states. The fi gure also 
shows that if past yield variations 
can be used as a guide to the future, 
then the odds of a large yield decline 
in South Dakota are greater than for 
Iowa. Over the past 28 years, South 
Dakota suffered yield declines of 10 
percent or more eight times com-
pared to only four times for Iowa.
But ACRE payments are trig-
gered by revenue declines, not yield 
declines. In addition, price levels de-
termine whether CCPs and LDPs will 
be triggered. There are two relevant 
measures of price risk that need to 
be accounted for. The fi rst is overall 
price strength in the 2009 marketing 
year. We could see prices weaken 
signifi cantly if the economic down-
turn continues for another year. We 
should see price strength if oil prices 
Figure 1. Percent deviation in actual corn yields from trend yields in Iowa 
and South Dakota
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unexpectedly climb, if food demand 
rebounds, or if there is a crop failure 
overseas. The second source of price 
risk is the impact on market prices 
from the size of the U.S. crop in 2009. 
Large U.S. crops would mean weaker 
prices, while a crop failure would 
send prices much higher. 
One way to capture both types 
of price risk is to use the current 
level of futures prices as a central 
estimate of price levels for 2009. 
Then the difference in payments 
between ACRE and traditional farm 
programs can be simulated for many 
different price deviations around 
this central tendency, accounting for 
historical volatilities and the impact 
of the size of the U.S. crop on prices. 
The analysis can then be repeated 
for scenarios for much weaker and 
much stronger prices in 2009. 
Simulation Results
Based on futures prices on January 
13, 2009, expected NASS season av-
erage prices for the 2009/10 market-
ing year are $3.88/bu, $9.20/bu, and 
$5.98 per bushel for corn, soybeans, 
and wheat, respectively. A compari-
son of these projected prices with 
the estimated ACRE prices that will 
be used to set the state revenue 
guarantees shows that expected 
prices for wheat and soybeans are 
quite a bit lower than the ACRE 
price while the corn projected price 
is just a bit below the ACRE price. 
This implies that if overall market 
conditions stay where they cur-
rently are, wheat and soybeans have 
a greater chance of receiving ACRE 
payments than does corn. Simu-
lated payment outcomes are carried 
out fi rst by centering 2009 prices at 
levels indicated by the January 13 
futures prices. To see what happens 
to payments under both stronger 
and weaker price situations, results 
are also generated for prices that 
are centered 35 percent higher and 
lower than the January 13 indicated 
levels. Results for a number of the 
Table 1 state-crop combinations are 
reported in Table 2. 
Table 2. Simulation Results
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Iowa Corn
There are a number of ways that 
a comparison of payments can be 
made. The method used here is 
to report total ACRE payments in 
a state acting as if all acreage is 
signed up to the program. These 
payments are compared to what 
traditional program payments 
would be if no acreage were signed 
up for ACRE. Thus, the results 
indicate what payments would 
occur if all of a state’s farmers 
participated in ACRE relative to 
the payments that would occur if 
none of the state’s farmers moved 
to ACRE. When 2009 corn prices 
are centered at $3.88/bu (that is, 
the average simulated price equals 
$3.88), average Iowa corn payments 
from ACRE are $242 million. If all 
Iowa corn farmers chose traditional 
programs, they would receive an 
average of only $4 million in LDPs 
and CCPs. This suggests that farm-
ers would be better off choosing 
ACRE. However, to obtain ACRE 
payments, Iowa corn farmers would 
have to give up $82 million in di-
rect payments. Thus, unless ACRE 
payments exceed $82 million, Iowa 
corn farmers would be better off 
not choosing ACRE. 
The last two columns of Table 
2 report some key probabilities. 
The fi rst of these is the probability 
that that ACRE pays out on the 2009 
crop. As shown for Iowa corn, there 
is a 32 percent chance that ACRE 
will pay out. The second column of 
probabilities is the probability that 
farmers will receive more in ACRE 
payments on their 2009 crop than 
they would receive from the tradi-
tional programs. For Iowa corn this 
probability is only 30 percent, which 
means that there is a 70 percent 
probability that Iowa corn farmers 
would receive more payments under 
traditional farm programs than un-
der ACRE. Taking these probabilities 
together, there is a good likelihood 
that the loss in direct payments will 
be greater than the gain in ACRE pay-
ments. But when ACRE pays, the av-
erage payout is much larger than the 
loss in direct payments. Therefore, 
at current price conditions, ACRE is 
similar to a subsidized crop insur-
ance program in which the loss of 
direct payments equals the farmer-
paid premium. A comparison of the 
expected ACRE payout to the loss in 
direct payments implies a premium 
subsidy rate of about two-thirds. 
Increasing the average 2009 
corn price by 35 percent (to $5.24/
bu) greatly decreases the chances 
of receiving an ACRE payment. The 
reason is that the ACRE price used 
to set the guarantee would be much 
lower than prevailing prices. The 
probability that ACRE payments 
exceed the loss of direct payments 
for Iowa corn decreases from 30 
percent to 2 percent. The expected 
ACRE payment is reduced from $240 
million to only $14 million. Thus, if 
farmers believe that 2009 prices will 
be much stronger than is indicated 
by current futures, then they will 
probably want to wait a year before 
signing up for ACRE.
If market conditions weaken 
considerably and the average 2009 
corn price falls 35 percent (to $2.52/
bu), then expected ACRE payments 
increase dramatically, to $1.7 billion. 
CCPs and LDPs increase also, but 
only to $369 million. The probability 
that ACRE would result in a payout 
is 97 percent in this scenario. And 
there is only a 4 percent chance for 
Iowa corn farmers that ACRE pay-
ments would be exceeded by LDPs 
and CCPs. So, dramatically lower 
prices favor ACRE even more than 
current prices. The reason is, of 
course, that ACRE provides support 
at $3.90 per bushel, which is much 
greater than the CCP trigger price.
Soybeans and Wheat
The overall pattern of results for 
Iowa corn holds for other corn states 
and for soybeans and wheat. But 
soybean and wheat farmers have 
an even greater incentive to partici-
pate in ACRE than do corn farmers 
because the ACRE prices for soy-
beans and wheat are higher than 
those currently indicated for 2009. 
Minnesota and South Dakota wheat 
farmers have an extra incentive to 
sign up for ACRE because growing 
conditions from 2004 to 2008 were 
better than average. Hence, the 
ACRE yield used to set the ACRE 
guarantee is quite high relative to 
the average-trend-adjusted yield 
from 1980 to 2007. 
Bottom Line
The conclusion that can be drawn 
from the Table 2 results is that most 
midwestern farmers will sign up for 
ACRE unless prices unexpectedly 
strengthen in the next few months. 
If market conditions stay reasonably 
constant, then farmers who sign 
up for ACRE will be compensated 
for their loss in direct payments if 
prices fall unexpectedly or if state-
wide growing conditions turn out to 
be poor in 2009. If prices stay up and 
growing conditions are good, then 
the loss in direct payments will not 
be compensated, but market returns 
for most farmers will be high. If mar-
ket conditions deteriorate in the next 
few months, then all farmers will 
have quite a large incentive to move 
into ACRE immediately, as there is a 
very small probability that payments 
from LDPs and CCPs will approach 
the level of ACRE payments. 
For More Information
For analysis of more crop-state 
combinations, see calculators avail-
able at http://www.card.iastate.edu/
ag_risk_tools/acre/. ◆
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Negotiations to reach an agree-ment on import health re-quirements to reopen the 
Korean market to U.S. beef took place 
over the past few years amid enor-
mous political and public resistance 
in Korea. The expected benefi ts, 
however, will make the negotiations 
well worth the effort for both sides. 
In 2003, Korean imports of U.S. beef 
reached $749.3 million before im-
ports were banned when a case of 
bovine spongiform encephalopathy 
(BSE) was diagnosed in the United 
States. U.S. beef began fl owing back 
into Korea in July 2008, and the value 
of these exports reached $270 mil-
lion by the end of November. Despite 
this success, rebuilding exports to 
reach the full potential of this market 
will take time. The following is a brief 
overview of several market condi-
tions that are dampening sales in the 
early months of renewed trade and 
longer-term expectations for condi-
tions that would greatly increase 
demand and market access.
Short-Term Challenges
Exports of U.S. beef were strong 
when the market opened in 2008, 
but demand was lower than had 
been anticipated by many Korean 
traders. USDA data indicate that 
beef exports to Korea reached 
16,640 metric tons in September 
but then fell to 5,940 metric tons in 
November. A number of events have 
combined to create a challenging 
market environment that is sup-
pressing demand for U.S. beef over 
the short term. 
As U.S. and Korean negotiators 
worked toward an agreement to 
reopen the Korean market in 2008, 
worsening global and domestic 
economic conditions became an 
important factor in the Korean gov-
U.S. Beef Faces Challenges in Korea Before Reaching Full Potential
ernment’s decision to lift the ban on 
U.S. beef. The value of the won was 
falling dramatically against world 
currencies such as the U.S. dollar, 
Japanese yen, and Chinese yuan, 
making it increasingly diffi cult for 
the Korean government to justify 
banning a lower-cost alternative to 
domestic beef and pork. An agree-
ment was reached on April 21, and 
U.S. beef offi cially re-entered the 
market on June 26. 
The won continued to weaken 
and by November 24 had reached 
its lowest level against the U.S. 
dollar during 2008, with a value of 
1,520 won per U.S. dollar compared 
to about 935 won per U.S. dollar in 
mid-January 2008. This low value 
coincided with the reintroduction 
of U.S. beef by Korea’s three major 
discount retail chains on November 
25. All three chains put U.S. beef in 
all their outlets, a combined total of 
295 stores. Initial sales fi gures were 
strong, but Korean consumers were 
much less able to afford beef than 
they had been the year before.
Another major factor affecting 
sales of U.S. beef has been public 
resistance in the form of boycotts 
and protests. Before and after the 
market reopened in 2008, protest-
ers organized massive demonstra-
tions against U.S. beef, and the issue 
brought an early end to the terms 
of several government offi cials. For 
many Koreans, the protests had at 
least as much to do with national-
ism, negative attitudes toward the 
current government, social confl ict, 
and anti-U.S. sentiment as they had 
to do with concerns about U.S. beef 
and food safety. U.S. beef became 
a focal point for the discontent 
created by many unrelated issues. 
The protests made restaurants and 
retailers reluctant to carry or adver-
tise U.S. beef for fear of becoming 
targets. And although the number 
and size of these protests have sub-
sided, they continue to take place in 
smaller cities and to affect U.S. beef 
sales. Retailers generally choose to 
remove U.S. beef from the shelves 
rather than incite the protestors and 
inconvenience customers more than 
absolutely necessary, and many 
restaurant owners still have not re-
turned U.S. beef to their menus.
Although the reasons for pro-
tests were not limited to food safety, 
genuine concern about food safety 
has certainly been a factor in con-
sumer decisions about purchasing 
U.S. beef. In addition to the BSE 
issue, unrelated food safety prob-
lems often raise the level of concern, 
especially about imported products, 
which are considered less safe than 
domestic products. News of prob-
lems such as dioxin in Chilean pork 
and concerns about food imports 
from China tend to create a ripple ef-
fect on sales of imported products.
Although the agreement to re-
open the market is consistent with 
recommendations of the World Or-
ganization for Animal Health (OIE) 
regarding beef animal age, U.S. beef 
exporters and Korean importers 
have agreed to a commercial under-
standing that only beef from cattle 
less than 30 months of age will be 
Before and after the 
market reopened in 
2008, protesters 
organized massive 
demonstrations against 
U.S. beef, and the issue 
brought an early end to 
the terms of several 
government offi cials. 
6           CENTER FOR AGRICULTURAL AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT                             WINTER 2009
Iowa Ag Review
imported into Korea to help build 
consumer confi dence in U.S. beef. 
Some differences remain between 
the United States and South Korea 
concerning specifi ed risk materials, 
and Korean importers are choosing 
not to import some variety meats 
until those differences are resolved.
Finally, many Korean traders 
greatly overestimated the demand 
for U.S. beef when the market 
opened and were forced to place 
beef into frozen storage as they 
waited for orders. Storing the beef 
allowed the importers to delay 
clearing product through customs 
and paying import tariffs, but the 
storage fees, the need to pay letters 
of credit on stored product, and 
diffi culty in obtaining bank credit 
created great fi nancial diffi culties 
for many importers, forcing many 
out of business. Others will stop 
purchasing U.S. beef until it is profi t-
able to do so.
 
Long-Term Potential
Despite the many challenges cur-
rently facing U.S. beef, longer-term 
expectations for the Korean market 
are for strong demand and a ma-
jor U.S. market share. Global and 
domestic economic recovery will 
be a major factor in normalizing the 
market. Despite the attention the 
protests against U.S. beef received, 
many consumers either want to 
make their own decisions about 
whether to buy U.S. beef or are un-
decided. The presence of U.S. beef in 
the market and programs to educate 
consumers about the safety, qual-
ity, and nutritional attributes of U.S. 
beef will help to encourage many of 
these consumers to purchase it as 
their economic situation improves. 
Consumer preference for grain-
fed beef and its suitability for use in 
Korean dishes will also help drive 
demand for U.S. beef over the long 
term. Prior to the 2003 ban, U.S. beef 
accounted for nearly 50 percent of 
total beef consumption in Korea. 
After the ban, Australia fi lled much 
of the import void created by the 
absence of U.S. beef but was unable 
to supply all the cuts U.S. export-
ers had been supplying, leaving this 
demand unfi lled. As protests con-
tinue to subside, more restaurants 
and retailers will carry U.S. beef. As 
this happens, mandatory country-
of-origin labeling of imported beef 
should benefi t U.S. beef as consum-
ers gain confi dence in U.S. product 
and buyers replace Australian beef 
with U.S. beef. 
Total beef consumption and 
demand for U.S. beef are also ex-
pected to increase as consumers 
switch from other protein sources 
back to beef. Following the 2003 
ban on U.S. beef, many consum-
ers switched to pork and chicken 
because of BSE concerns and high 
beef prices. Many of these consum-
ers are expected to begin replacing 
some pork and chicken with beef. 
For example, the return of U.S. beef 
to barbeque restaurants is expect-
ed to replace large volumes of pork, 
including U.S. pork.
Finally, as demand increases, 
ratifi cation of the Korea-U.S. Free 
Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA) 
would increase market access. 
Ratifi cation by both countries is 
still pending, and many industry 
experts expect ratifi cation in Korea. 
Because beef is a sensitive product 
in Korea, tariff reductions on U.S. 
beef are scheduled to occur during 
a 15-year phase-in period. Tariffs 
on muscle cuts will decline from 40 
percent (the current level) to zero 
in 15 equal annual increments. An 
initial safeguard of 270,000 metric 
tons will increase at a compound 2 
percent annual rate to 354,000 met-
ric tons over the phase-in period. In 
year 16 and beyond, tariffs will be 
zero and the safeguard will no lon-
ger apply. Tariffs on U.S. beef offal 
also will decline from current levels 
of 18 percent and 27 percent to zero 
in 15 equal annual reductions, with 
no safeguards.
Because economic recovery is 
such an important factor in increas-
ing imports of U.S. beef and the 
pace at which recovery will occur is 
unknown, it is diffi cult to determine 
exactly when the market for U.S. 
beef will fully recover. However, the 
combination of eventual strong de-
mand and ratifi cation of the KORUS 
FTA will position U.S. beef exporters 
to more than recover the export vol-
ume lost to the 2003 beef ban. ◆
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The Renewable Fuels Standard (RFS) mandates that the na-tion’s fuel supply contain at 
least 11.1 billion gallons of biofuels 
in 2009 and 12.9 billion gallons in 
2010. Of these volumes, biodiesel 
must make up at least 500 million 
gallons in 2009 and 650 million 
gallons in 2010. Other “advanced” 
biofuels must make up 100 million 
gallons in 2009 and 200 million gal-
lons in 2010. If the volumes of biodie-
sel and other advanced biofuels are 
exactly met, then the RFS mandates 
consumption of 10.5 and 12.0 billion 
gallons of conventional biofuels, the 
most important of which is domestic 
corn ethanol and Brazilian ethanol 
that is not used to meet the other 
advanced biofuels mandate. The 
corn and soybean lobbies, together 
with the biofuels industry, worked 
hard to get these mandates passed. 
The biofuels industry wanted 
guarantees that they would have a 
market for their product. Corn and 
soybean farmers wanted to lock in 
increased demand for their crops. 
An examination of the linkages 
between the RFS, energy prices, 
and crop prices shows how the RFS 
works in the interest of corn and 
soybean farmers by creating a fl oor 
under their commodity prices. 
Impact of the RFS on Biofuels 
and Crop Prices
Market forces could be used to 
determine ethanol and biodiesel 
prices. Fuel blenders use biofuels 
in their blends if the price is low 
enough to make it worth their while, 
and biofuels producers produce 
biofuels if the price is high enough 
to cover their costs. The market-
clearing price equalizes blenders’ 
Renewable Identifi cation Numbers and the Renewable Fuels 
Standard: How They Support Corn and Soybean Prices
willingness to pay for another mil-
lion gallons of biofuels to the cost 
of producing the additional mil-
lion gallons. Existing tax credits 
and ethanol import tariffs serve to 
boost the demand for U.S. biofuels 
so the market-clearing price and 
quantity of biofuels is greater than 
if they did not exist. If the market-
clearing production of biofuels is 
greater than the RFS, then the RFS 
has no impact on production or 
price. However, market forces along 
with tax credits and tariffs may not 
stimulate enough biofuels produc-
tion to meet the RFS. This situation 
will occur if blenders’ willingness 
to pay for more biofuels is less than 
the cost of producing them. The 
gap between willingness to pay and 
production costs must be closed 
somehow if the RFS is to be met.
The gap can be closed by reduc-
ing production costs or by increas-
ing blenders’ willingness to pay. Pro-
duction costs could be decreased 
through outright subsidies. For 
example, the cost of corn to ethanol 
producers could be lowered through 
price subsidies. This would entail 
losses to taxpayers and gains to corn 
farmers. Or blenders’ purchases 
of biofuels could be directly subsi-
dized by increasing the blenders’ tax 
credit suffi ciently to increase their 
willingness to pay for biofuels. This 
alternative would also involve losses 
to taxpayers to the benefi t of blend-
ers and corn farmers. The alterna-
tive that was chosen by Congress 
was to specify how much biofuels 
must be used by each fuel refi ner, 
importer, and blender. If these enti-
ties choose to use less than their re-
quired amount, then they are free to 
buy credits from others who choose 
to use more than their required 
amount. Because each batch of bio-
fuels has a unique Renewable Identi-
fi cation Number (RIN) attached to it, 
it is easy to keep track of how much 
biofuels each entity is using. RINs 
are bought by those who fi nd it more 
profi table to buy credits rather than 
biofuels. RINs are sold by those who 
generate excess RINs by using more 
biofuels than required.
The supply of excess RINs is 
greater than the demand for RINs 
when the market-clearing quan-
tity of biofuels is greater than the 
RFS. For example, if consumption 
of biofuels is 12 billion gallons and 
the RFS is 10 billion gallons, then 
RINs that represent 2 billion gallons 
of biofuels have no use. The excess 
supply of RINS will drive their price 
down to almost zero. However, a 
shortage of RINs will occur if the 
market price of biofuels is such that 
blenders want to buy more RINs 
than biofuels. This shortage will 
cause the price of RINs to increase. 
An increase in the price of RINs will 
begin to increase the attractiveness 
of biofuels relative to RINs, thereby 
increasing the demand for ethanol. 
The price of RINs will keep rising 
until the demand for biofuels grows 
enough to bridge the gap between 
RINs are bought 
by those who fi nd it 
more profi table to buy 
credits rather than 
biofuels. RINs are sold 
by those who generate 
excess RINs by 
using more biofuels
 than required. 
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the willingness to pay for ethanol 
and the cost of producing ethanol. 
The RFS will be met when this gap 
is bridged. The market for RINs 
combined with the authority of the 
Environmental Protection Agency 
will ensure that the price of biofuels 
increases enough to cover the costs 
of producing enough biofuels to 
meet the RFS. 
The power of the market for RINs 
ensures that ethanol demand will 
generate high enough biofuel prices 
to allow biofuel plants to cover their 
production costs up to the RFS. In-
creased demand for biofuels trans-
lates directly into increased demand 
and higher prices for feedstocks. 
For example, Figure 1 shows that 
daily movements in nearby corn 
and ethanol prices on the Chicago 
Board of Trade are highly correlated, 
with a correlation coeffi cient of 0.97. 
This high correlation suggests that 
the ability of ethanol plants to pay 
for corn has largely determined the 
price of corn in the last year. If this 
relationship continues to hold, then 
any RFS-induced increase in the 
price of ethanol will result in higher 
corn prices. The market for RINs is 
the mechanism by which corn prices 
are supported by the RFS.
Outlook for Corn and 
Soybean Prices
The amount of corn acreage that will 
be needed in 2009 can be estimated 
using the latest USDA data, released 
on January 12. If food, feed, and ex-
ports remain at projected levels for 
the current marketing year, 11 billion 
gallons of corn ethanol are needed to 
meet the RFS, and 2009/10 carryout 
stocks are set at 1.5 billion bushels, 
then 12.1 billion bushels of corn will 
be needed from the 2009 crop. This 
will require approximately 86 mil-
lion acres to be planted at an average 
yield per planted acre of 140 bushels. 
To get 86 million acres of corn will 
require that a signifi cant number 
of corn acres be planted on acres 
that were planted to corn in 2008. 
Because yields typically drop when 
corn is planted after corn, and be-
cause it takes more nitrogen fertilizer 
and higher-priced seed to plant corn 
after corn, this level of acreage will 
not be planted unless market prices 
make it worthwhile for enough farm-
ers to plant corn after corn. 
Figure 2 shows the daily changes 
in the expected returns from plant-
ing an acre of corn this spring on 
ground that was planted to corn 
instead of planting an acre of soy-
beans. (See the accompanying ar-
ticle on page 10 for an explanation of 
this difference in returns.) As shown, 
there currently is no incentive for 
any farmer to plant corn after corn. 
If market prices stay where they 
are, then this lack of incentive to 
plant corn will mean that corn acre-
age will drop to perhaps 81 million 
acres. At 140 bushels per acre, this 
would result in production of 11.3 
billion bushels, which would mean a 
drawdown in stocks combined with 
a rationing of feed and export de-
mand with higher corn prices in the 
2009 marketing year. If the foregoing 
Figure 1. Indices of corn and ethanol prices (January 15, 2008 = 100)
Figure 2. Returns to planting corn after corn minus returns to planting 
soybeans after corn
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arithmetic is correct, and if market 
prices really do refl ect all available 
information, then prices will not 
stay where they are because current 
prices do not refl ect the potential 
for higher prices in 2009. Either the 
price of corn will need to be bid up 
or the price of soybeans will need to 
drop. Because of worries about the 
size of the South American soybean 
crop, future export demand for U.S. 
soybeans has also helped push soy-
bean prices higher. If South Ameri-
can yields turn out to be low, then it 
is unlikely that soybean prices would 
drop by much, which would push the 
price of corn higher. If South Ameri-
can yields turn out to be good and 
the world recession continues, the 
incentive to plant corn on corn could 
be increased if soybean prices drop 
more than corn prices.
RINs and Tax Credits
Because tax credits increase the 
demand for biofuels, they shrink or 
eliminate the gap between the will-
ingness to pay for biofuels and pro-
duction costs. If the gap is complete-
ly eliminated, then tax credits drive 
the price of RINs down to zero. If 
the gap is only partially eliminated, 
then the price of RINs is decreased 
by the amount of the tax credit. The 
current price of 2009 ethanol RINs is 
about 7¢ per gallon. The tax credit is 
45¢ per gallon. Thus, if the tax credit 
were eliminated, then the price of 
RINs would rise to approximately 
52¢ per gallon. 
This direct substitution between 
the price of RINs and the tax credit 
calls into question why both are 
needed. If the RFS is binding, then 
eliminating the tax credit would 
not change the demand for biofuels 
or the demand for corn and soy-
beans. Thus, the prices of biofuels, 
corn, and soybeans would all be 
unchanged. If the mandate is not 
binding then the tax credit provides 
support to biofuels and crops be-
yond that needed to meet the RFS, 
with resulting increases in feed and 
food costs. 
A straightforward alternative 
would be to eliminate the tax credit. 
Taxpayers would benefi t. Blenders 
and fuel users, on the other hand, 
would likely object to this change 
because rather than receiving a tax-
payer subsidy they would be taxed 
through higher RIN prices. However, 
one benefi t of this change would 
be that the cost of meeting the RFS 
would be fully and transparently 
refl ected in the value of RINs, thus 
leading to a more informed public 
debate about the costs and benefi ts 
of biofuels. ◆
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Increased demand for corn by the ethanol industry has increased corn planted acreage from his-
torical levels. From 2001 to 2006, an 
average of 79 million acres of corn 
was planted in the United States, with 
the highest acreage being 81.8 million 
acres in 2005. In 2007, corn acreage 
increased to 93.5 million acres. Figure 
1 shows that a large proportion of the 
2007 increase in corn acreage came 
from midwestern farmers reducing 
soybean acreage in favor of corn. 
Corn acreage declined by 7.5 mil-
lion acres—to 86 million acres—in 
2008 while soybean acreage in-
creased by almost 11 million acres. 
Figure 2 shows that a large proportion 
of the soybean acreage increase came 
from a reduction in corn acreage. Oth-
er sources of soybean acreage in 2008 
included switching from crops other 
than corn, loss of Conservation Re-
serve Program land, and an increase 
in soybean double cropping. 
Because most corn grown in the 
Corn Belt is grown in rotation with 
soybeans, a large proportion of the 
expanded U.S. corn acreage has 
come about because some farmers 
have chosen to plant corn on land 
that was planted to corn in the previ-
ous year. But planting corn after corn 
instead of corn after soybeans can 
reduce yields and increase produc-
tion costs. Production costs increase 
because of the need for additional 
nitrogen fertilizer, increased tillage, 
and increased pesticide costs to con-
trol corn rootworm. Corn rootworm 
control can be obtained by buying 
more expensive seed recently devel-
oped for that purpose. In addition, 
by planting corn after corn instead of 
Corn or Soybeans for 2009?
Figure 1. Change in corn and soybean acreage by state in 2007 from 2006
Figure 2. Change in corn and soybean acreage by state in 2008 from 2007
planting corn after soybeans, a farm-
er gives up the benefi ts the following 
year of being able to plant corn after 
a crop of soybeans. 
To induce farmers to plant ad-
equate corn acreage to meet growing 
ethanol demand, the price of corn 
that a farmer should expect to re-
ceive must rise relative to the price of 
soybeans. If it doesn’t, then farmers 
will choose not to expand corn-on-
corn acreage. 
Calculating Planting Incentives
A simple equation can be used to 
calculate the incentive to plant corn 
after corn instead of soybeans after 
corn. It is simply the difference in ex-
pected return this year from planting 
corn after corn versus corn after soy-
beans minus the forgone benefi ts of 
planting corn after soybeans the fol-
lowing year. Because these forgone 
benefi ts exist in the future, they need 
to be discounted to today’s dollars.
The daily value of this incentive 
to plant corn after corn is graphed in 
Figure 3 for 2001 to 2006, 2007, 2008, 
and 2009. Because most farmers do 
not begin to worry about the follow-
ing year’s crop until they harvest 
this year’s crop, only daily values 
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after October 20 in the fall before 
planting are shown. May 20 is about 
the last day that farmers can choose 
to plant corn instead of soybeans. 
Daily values for new crop futures 
(December for corn and November 
for soybeans) adjusted for average 
midwestern basis are used in the 
calculations.
Figure 3 shows that there was 
no incentive to plant corn after corn 
from 2001 to 2006. Consequently, 
corn acreage averaged 79 million 
acres, varying from 75.7 in 2001 to 
81.8 in 2005. There was no day dur-
ing this period when the expected 
return to planting corn after corn 
exceeded the expected return 
from planting soybeans after corn. 
Of course, some farmers chose to 
plant corn after corn. These farmers 
must have had some advantage not 
captured by the measure graphed 
in Figure 3. For example, access to 
abundant hog manure induces some 
farmers to plant continuous corn.
Recent Incentives and Outcomes
Early in January of 2007, the market 
created a positive incentive to plant 
corn after corn. This incentive lasted 
until the beginning of April before 
it disappeared. Notice also that for 
most of the period after the 2006 
harvest, the disincentive for planting 
corn after corn was much less than 
it had been in previous years. This 
pattern of incentives in 2007 was 
evidently quite strong given the large 
movement of soybean acres to corn 
acres shown in Figure 1. 
The incentives to plant corn after 
corn were negative and lower in 2008 
than in 2007 until the second week 
in March. By that time many farmers 
who might have considered planting 
corn after corn had already decid-
ed to plant soybeans instead. The 
market likely responded to a fear of 
inadequate corn acreage and created 
a large incentive for farmers to switch 
their plans toward corn. The late-
ness of the signal probably prevented 
many farmers from responding.
The incentives for the 2009 
crop started higher than in either 
2007 or 2008 but they quickly fell 
in mid-December to become quite 
negative. After rebounding some-
what, the latest use data from USDA 
released on January 12 drove corn 
prices sharply down. Currently the 
disincentive to plant corn after corn 
is about the same as the average 
disincentive during 2001 to 2006. This 
suggests that corn acreage will have 
trouble exceeding 80 million acres in 
2009. But projected demand for corn 
exceeds what can be grown on 80 mil-
lion acres. Consequently, we should 
expect signifi cant strengthening in 
corn prices relative to soybean prices 
before planting. ◆
Figure 3. Daily value of incentive to plant corn after corn
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